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I. 
INTRODUCTION 
COMES NOW, Ryan T. Davidson, Defendant-Appellant in the above-entitled action, 
representing himself, with this opening brief in support of his appeal. 
A. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a '"Driving Without Privileges" case. (Idaho Code§ 18-8001). Davidson pied 
guilty to DWP while reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss the 
charge on constitutional grounds. 
8. STAH~MENT OFF ACTS AND SUMMARY OF PRIOR PROCEEDINGS 
In June of 2007, Davidson was charged with the infractions of "driving on an expired 
license" and "fictitious display of plates," violations of Idaho Code sections §§ 49-319 and 
49-456, respectively. A trial was held on July 23, 2007, where Davidson was found guilty on 
both counts and was sentenced to the statutory penalties. Davidson failed to pay the penalties. 
Thereafter, Davidson received a notice of driver's license suspension from the Idaho 
Transportation Department. 
On November 29th, 2007, Davidson was arrested for driving without privileges the 
offense which is currently before the Court. Based on legally incorrect advice supplied by the 
Public Defender, Davidson pied guilty to the charge. Later, when the ineffective assistance of 
Davidson's counsel became manifest, Davidson filed a prose motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea, which was granted. 
The Court then attempted to re-assign the same deficient counsel to Davidson, who 
objected. Based on the objection, the Court assigned conflict counsel from outside the Public 
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Defender's office. When the conflict counsel refused to file a motion to dismiss the case, 
Davidson had no choice but to proceed pro se, and filed his own motion to dismiss. The 
motion was denied by the Magistrate Judge in a written ruling dated May 14 th, 2009. 
Instead of proceeding to a jury trial, Davidson made it known that he wished to file a 
conditional plea of guilty, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. At 
a special sentencing hearing held on June l 61\ 2009, Davidson orally motioned for a 
conditional plea of guilty which was not objected to by the City of Boise. The Court took 
Davidson's guilty plea, and sentenced him to three days jail with a six-month license 
suspension. Instead of staying the execution of the sentence as Davidson requested - the 
Court immediately remanded Davidson into custody to serve his jail sentence, on the grounds 
that Davidson's conditional plea had not been "in writing." 
Through a third party, Davidson, while still incarcerated, had his written conditional 
plea and proposed order for immediate stay of execution delivered to the Magistrate Judge for 
his signature. However, the order was not signed for two more weeks, and as a result, 
Davidson served his entire jail sentence. 
Davidson then appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss to the District Court. A 
hearing was held on August 19, 2010, and the Court later upheld the Magistrate Judge's 
decision in a written decision dated October I, 2010. Davidson now appeals the denial of his 
motion to dismiss to the Supreme Court of Idaho. 
The appeal is not moot, however, as Davidson still has the 180-day license suspension 
hanging over his head. 
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II. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1) Davidson's drivers' license was suspended without procedural due process. 
Although some procedural due process is available, it is not enough to satisfy the 14th 
Amendment. 
2) The suspension of Davidson's license was illegal under Idaho Code. That a 
suspension was illegal should be a valid defense to the charge of DWP, and should not be 
considered waived by failure to address it prior to the criminal charge. 
3) The law which authorized a suspension of Davidson's license is unreasonable 
and an unnecessary infringement of the right to travel on the public highway, and constitutes a 
violation of substantive due process. 
4) Davidson's counsel was so ineffective it should be deemed to be no counsel, 
which violates his rights under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
5) Davidson's immediate remand to jail after sentencing by the Magistrate Judge 
constituted an abuse of discretion. 
6) Davidson is entitled to an award of attorney fees under the Private Attorney 
General Doctrine (which should be extended to apply to criminal cases), and prior rulings 
holding that prose litigants are held to the same standards as attorneys. As such, they should 
be compensated like attorneys pursuant to Idaho Code§ 19-860 (b). 
Both the Magistrate Judge and the District Judge ruled against Davidson on all the 
issues presented above. Davidson hereby requests that this Court reverse the decision of the 
lower Court and dismiss the charge of driving without privileges filed against him. 
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III. 
ARGUMENT 
1. 
DAVIDSON WAS DENIED PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS UNDER§ 49-1505 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Idaho Code § 49-1505 mandates that the Transportation Department (I.T.D.) 
immediately suspend an individual's drivers' license upon receiving a notice of non-payment 
of a traffic infraction from a court. After Davidson was convicted of two infractions, he failed 
to pay the judgment. This led to him receiving the standard notice from I.T.D. stating that his 
iicense would be suspended in thirty days if he did not pay the penalty. ( See Exhibit •A.') 
However, this notice did not inform Davidson of any right to appeal or to challenge the 
suspension on any grounds. Prior to Davidson's receipt of the notice of suspension, he was 
not sent any notice from the court that offered him an opportunity for either an administrative 
or court hearing, wherein he could contest the proposed suspension on legal or administrative 
grounds. As such, he was deprived of his liberty (the driver's license and use of his 
automobile) without the appropriate procedural due process safeguards. 
In the immediate case, such due process considerations are relevant to Davidson's 
defense, because a driver cannot be convicted of driving without privileges if the original 
suspension violated due process. State v. Dolson, 138 Wash.2d 773, 783, 982 P.2d 100, 105 
( 1999); Redmond v. it1oore, 151 Wash.2d 664, 670, 91 P.3d 875, 879 (2004). 
B. ANALYSIS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS LAW AND PRECEDENT 
In Idaho, a citizen's use of a motor vehicle on the highway is a right, and not a 
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privilege. Adams v. Pocatello, 91 Idaho 99, 101, 416 P .2d 46, 48 (l 966); Packa.rd v. 0 'Neil, 
45 Idaho 427,262 P. 881, 885 (1927). Nevertheless, whether it is denominated a "right" or a 
"privilege," it is well settled that driver's licenses may not be suspended or revoked "without 
that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment." Dixon v. Love, 431 
U.S. 105, ll2, 97 S.Ct. 1723, 52 L.Ed.2d 172 (1977) (quoting Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 
539, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971)); State v. Kouni, 58 Idaho 493, 76 P.2d 917 (1938); 
City ofRedmond v. Arroyo-Murillo, 149 Wash.2d 607, 612, 70 P.3d 947 (2003). Though the 
procedures may vary according to the interest at stake, "[t]he fundamental requirement of due 
process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.' " 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) ( quoting 
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965).) "Due process 
of law is not necessarily satisfied by any process which the Legislature may by law provide, 
but by such process only as safeguards and protects the fundamental, constitutional rights of 
the citizen. Where the state confers a license upon an individual... such license becomes a 
valuable personal right which cannot be denied or abridged in any manner except after due 
notice and a fair and impartial hearing before an unbiased tribunal." Abrams v. Jones, 35 
Idaho 532,207 P. 724, 727 (1922). 
C. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS APPLIED TO DRIVER'S LICENSE SUSPENSIONS 
Many due process challenges to drivers' license suspension statutes have been filed in 
this and other jurisdictions. The general theme of these challenges is that due process requires 
that an individual must be afforded a hearing prior to the suspension of their drivers' license 
in all cases. In analyzing these challenges, courts use a due process balancing test enumerated 
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in Matthews v. Eldridge, supra., which weighs the public interests against the rights of the 
individual. From the U.S. Supreme Court on down, the caselaw has stated that the 
government may summarily suspend a driver's license without hearing, if failing to do so 
would put the public's safety at risk, and a prompt post-suspension hearing is available. See 
Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 97 S.Ct. 1723, 52 L.Ed.2d 172 (1977); State v. Ankney, 109 
[daho 1, 704 P.2d 333 (1985); Matter of McNeely, 119 [daho 182, 804 P.2d 911 
(Ct.App.1990). 
However, using the Eldridge scale, courts have also held that as the risk to public 
safety decreases, the individual's right to a pre-suspension hearing increases. See Redmond v. 
Afoore, 151 Wash.2d 664, 91 P.3d 875 (2004) 1• Pre-Eldridge cases, using similar analysis to 
hold that a hearing is required prior to the suspension of a driver's license, include Bell v. 
Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971);2 Reese v. Kassab, 334 F.Supp. 
744 (W.D.Pa.1971); Warner v. Trombetta, 348 F.Supp. 1068 (M.D.Pa.1972); and People v. 
Nothaus, 14 7 Colo. 210, 363 P.2d 180 (I 961 ). 
In Redmond, supra, the Supreme Court of Washington held that it would violate 
"The public safety interest present in Stauffer is not at issue here. The State's interest in suspending an 
individual's driver's license for failing to appear, pay, or comply with a notice of traffic infraction is in the 
efficient administration of traffic regulations and in ensuring offending drivers appear in court, pay applicable 
fines, and comply with court orders. Although undoubtedly important, this interest does not rise to the level of 
the State's compelling interest in keeping unsafe drivers off the roadways. Simply put, failing to resolve a notice 
of traffic infraction does not pose the same threat to public safety as habitually unsafe drivers do." Ibid at 882. 
In Dixon v. love, 431 U.S. 105, 97 S.Ct. 1723, 52 L.Ed.2d 172 (1977), the Supreme Court discusses a 
sliding scale of public safety concerns when determining what level of due process should be required: "Far 
more substantial than the administrative burden, however, is the important public interest in safety on the roads 
and highways, and in the prompt removal of a safety hazard. This factor fully distinguishes Bell v. Burson, 
supra, where the "only purpose" of the Georgia statute there under consideration was "to obtain security from 
which to pay any judgments against the licensee resulting from the accident". In contrast, the Illinois statute at 
issue in the instant case is designed to keep off the roads those drivers who are unable or unwilling to respect 
traffic rules and the safety of others." 431 U.S. at 114 - 115 (internal citations omitted). 
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procedural due process if an individual whose license was suspended for failure to pay an 
infraction penalty was not afforded a pre-suspension hearing. The Redmond decision is well 
reasoned and persuasive, and the Idaho Courts should adopt the decision as law. The 
Redmond case does not stand for the proposition that a hearing must be offered prior to any 
type of driver's license suspension. For instance, it does not apply when the government's 
compelling interest is in keeping the public safe from intoxicated or unsafe drivers. Id. at 
676-77. Therefore, it is not in conflict with the line of Idaho authority finding due process 
does not require a hearing prior to suspending a suspect's license for failure to submit to a 
blood/alcohol evidentiary test. See, e.g. State v. Ankney, l 09 Idaho I, 704 P.2d 333 ( 1985). 
Redmond is also not in conflict with Adams v. Pocatello, 91 Idaho 99, 416 P.2d 46 (1966), 
where the compelling government interest was in protecting the public from uninsured 
drivers. In the case of Davidson's suspension for failure to pay a fine, as was the case in 
Redmond, the government's compelling interest is, at most, to promote " ... the efficient 
administration of traffic regulations and in ensuring offending drivers appear in court, pay 
applicable fines, and comply with court orders." Id. at 677. This interest is not substantial 
enough to deprive a citizen of a driver's license without a pre-suspension hearing, Id., as it 
does not affect "the public health, morals, safety or welfare." Yellow Cab Taxi Service v. City 
of Twin Falls, 68 Idaho 145, 151, 190 P.2d 681,684 (1948), Po/lion v. Lewis, 320 F.Supp. 
1343, 1356 (N.D.Ill.1970). 
D. DOES IDAHO CODE§ 49-1505 VIOLATE PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS? 
Idaho Code § 49-1505 is the law under which Davidson's license was suspended. It 
should be viewed through the prism of Redmond, with the assumption that if it fails to afford 
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an individual a meaningful pre-suspension hearing, it would be in violation of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
An examination of the statute seems to indicate that it contains the necessary 
procedural due process protections, and would therefore be considered constitutional. It states 
as follows: 
The department shall immediately suspend the driver's license, 
permit and operating privileges of any driver upon receiving 
notice from any court of the state that a person has failed to pay 
the penalty for a traffic infraction judgment. The notice may be 
sent to the department by any court which shall certify that a 
judgment for an infraction not involving a pedestrian or a 
bicycle violation has been entered against the person and that he 
has failed to pay the penalty after notice and hearing. or 
opportunity for hearing. as prescribed by rule of the supreme 
court. No notice of nonpayment of an infraction penalty shall 
be sent to the department if the court finds that the person 
failing to pay the penalty has a complete and continuing 
financial inability to pay the penalty. 
Idaho Code § 49-1505 ( 1) 
The underlined portion indicates that an individual has a right to a court hearing to 
contest a license suspension before it goes into effect. It further mandates that a notice be sent 
to the individual informing them of their right to a hearing. 
E. THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO ABIDE BY IDAHO CODE § 49-1505 
In Davidson's case, he was found guilty of committing two infractions. He did not 
pay the penalty. At this point, he should have received a notice from the court informing him 
of his right to a hearing to contest the proposed suspension of his drivers' license for failure to 
pay - a proceeding completely separate from the infraction trial. But Davidson did not ever 
receive this mandatory notice. A search of the casefiles reveals no attempt by the court to 
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send Davidson a notice. 3 Davidson did receive a suspension notice from I.T.D., but this is not 
the notice contemplated in § 49-1505. According to the notice itself (Exhibit 'A'), it was 
generated after I.T.D. received a notice of non-payment from the District Court. Further, that 
notice contains no instructions on how to challenge or appeal a suspension, which renders it 
deficient under a due process analysis. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 
1, 13-15, 98 S.Ct. 1554, 56 L.Ed.2d 30 (1978); Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 
U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950). Section 49-1505 requires the court to give 
an individual notice and opportunity for hearing before it sends the notice of non-payment to 
I.T.D. A copy of the court's "notice of nonpayment" to I.T.D. is included as Exhibit 'B.' It 
states that Davidson was convicted of an infraction on July 23, 2007, and that he was given 
until July 23, 2007 to pay the penalty, but did not. Beneath this language are two check 
boxes, which state, "After notice of judgment and opportunity for hearing," and, "After 
hearing and finding by the Court that the defendant does not have a complete and continuing 
financial inability to pay the penalty." Tellingly, neither box is checked. An example of the 
notice mandated by § 49-1505 that should have been sent is attached as Exhibit 'E.' 
Not only did the court fail to send Davidson the critical notice, it submitted its notice 
of nonpayment to I.T.D. prematurely in violation of statute. Idaho Code§ 49-1505 states that 
the court shall send notice to the department that an individual has failed to pay a traffic 
infraction judgment. "Judgment" is defined at Idaho Code § 49-111 (1 ): 
"Judgment" means a decree which shall have become final by 
expiration without appeal by the time within which an appeal 
might have been perfected, or by final affirmation on appeal, 
This includes both the casefile in the immediate case and of the original infraction: No. T0724995. 
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rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction of any state or of 
the United States, upon a cause of action arising out of the 
ownership, maintenance or use of any motor vehicle ... 
Therefore, a conviction on an infraction does not become a "judgment" until the time 
for an appeal has expired, or until the appellate process is exhausted. Appeals of infraction 
convictions are taken and processed in the manner prescribed for criminal appeals from the 
magistrates division to the district court by the Idaho Criminal Rules. I.LR. 15. Idaho 
Criminal Rule 54.3 states that the time in which to file an appeal expires 42 days after 
conviction. Davidson was found guilty of the two non-moving violations on July 23, 2007. 
The notice of non-payment that the court sent to I.T.D. is dated August 22, 2007. (See 
Exhibit 'B.') That's twelve days prior to the expiration of the time to file an appeal. As such, 
the Magistrate Judge violated Davidson's rights under§ 49-1505 by failing to send him the 
required notice and by prematurely sending notice of non-payment to 1.T.D. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Because the court did not send the mandatory notice with opportunity for hearing to 
Davidson prior to sending a notice of nonpayment to I.T.D., Davidson's rights were violated 
under both the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and under the statute itself. 
"This Court has consistently recognized that a permit of the nature here involved is a valuable 
property right and can be revoked only in the manner provided by statute." Arrow 
Transportation Co. v. Idaho Public Utilities Commission, 85 Idaho 307,379 P.2d 422 (1963). 
Therefore, the Supreme Court should reverse the lower court and dismiss the charge of 
driving without privileges against Davidson since his license was suspended in violation of 
both Idaho Code § 49-1505 and procedural due process. 
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2. 
IDAHO COURT RULES DEPRIVE DAVIDSON OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Even if§ 49-1505 is considered constitutional by the standards set forth in Redmond v. 
Moore, and if the Court rules against the Appellant on the lack of notice claim above, 
Davidson's right to due process was still violated because the Idaho Infraction Rules do not 
provide adequate procedural safeguards and are in conflict with state code. 
In crafting § 49-1505, the Idaho Legislature decided to leave much of the procedural 
mechanics up to the discretion of the Supreme Court. 
The department shall immediately suspend the driver's license, 
permit and operating privileges of any driver upon receiving 
notice from any court of the state that a person has failed to pay 
the penalty for a traffic infraction judgment. The notice may be 
sent to the department by any court which shall certify that a 
judgment for an infraction not involving a pedestrian or a 
bicycle violation has been entered against the person and that he 
has failed to pay the penalty after notice and hearing, or 
opportunity for hearing, as prescribed by rule of the supreme 
court. No notice of nonpayment of an infraction penalty shall 
be sent to the department if the court finds that the person 
failing to pay the penalty has a complete and continuing 
financial inability to pay the penalty. 
Idaho Code § 49-1505 (1) 
If the Supreme Court has failed to promulgate rules pursuant to the above law, or if the 
rules are illegal or defective, an individual's right to due process would be violated, since the 
process itself would be flawed. The process set up by the up Idaho Supreme Court must 
therefore be analyzed as part of an overall due process determination. 
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8. DOES l.l.R. 11 PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS SAFEGUARDS? 
An examination of the Idaho Infraction Rules reveals two separate rules that seem to 
have been promulgated pursuant to§ 49-1505: 
Rule 10. (a) Suspension of License. If a defendant fails 
to pay a traffic infraction penalty, ( 1) within the time allowed 
by a Notice of Default Judgment under Rule 8(d), or (2) within 
the time allowed by Deferred Payment Agreement under Rule 
9(t), or (3) within such further time as allowed by order of the 
court; then, unless the court makes a finding under Rule 11 that 
the defendant has shown that the defendant has complete and 
continuing financial inability to pay the penalty, the court shall 
sign a notice of nonpayment of penalty and send it to the 
Department of Transportation for suspension of defendant's 
drivers' license as provided by law. 
Rule 11. (a) Show Cause Hearing. A show cause 
hearing as to whether a defendant's driver's license should be 
suspended for nonpayment of a penalty shall be held by the 
court, (1) if a defendant appears in court at the time indicated in 
a Deferred Payment Agreement made under Rule 9(t), or (2) if 
the defendant requests a hearing before the payment date for a 
penalty as authorized under a Notice of Default Judgment 
issued under Rule 8( d), or (3) at any other time in the discretion 
of the court. The show cause hearing shall be an evidentiary 
hearing to determine if the defendant has the complete and 
continuing financial inability to pay the penalty. The defendant 
shall testify under oath and be subject to cross examination. 
(b) Finding of Court. After a hearing under this rule, if the 
court finds that the defendant has a complete and continuing 
financial inability to pay the penalty, no notice of nonpayment 
shall be sent to the Department of Transportation but the court 
may enter appropriate orders regarding the judgment which may 
include the cancellation of the penalty. If the court finds that the 
defendant does not have a complete and continuing financial 
inability to pay the penalty but has not paid the penalty, it may 
sign a notice of nonpayment of penalty and send it to the 
Department of Transportation for the suspension of defendant's 
driver's license and may enter other appropriate orders to 
enforce payment of the penalty. The court shall not be required 
to make written findings other than to issue a notice of 
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nonpayment or enter other appropriate orders. 
(c) Effect of Suspension of Driver's License. If a defendant's 
driver's license is suspended for nonpayment of a penalty, upon 
the expiration of such ninety (90) day suspension the clerk of 
the court will continue to maintain the citation on which the 
penalty was imposed for a period of three (3) years. If the 
penalty is not paid within such three (3) year period, the clerk 
shall then cancel the delinquent penalty and close the file. 
Because Rule 10 cross-references the procedure of Rule 11, it does not need to be 
analyzed separately. There do not appear to be any other rules relating to the "notice and 
hearing" provision of§ 49-1505. 
The question, then, is whether or not the process of Idaho Infraction Rule 11 meets the 
requirements of the Due Process Clause and of Idaho Code. This answer to this question is 
definitively no. 
For this analysis, it needs to be asked exactly what kind of hearing needs to take place 
prior to the suspension of a driver's license for failure to pay a fine? When weighing a 
suspect process, the Eldridge test inquires as to what the risk of an erroneous deprivation is 
through the procedures used. Id. at 335. How might a drivers' license be erroneously 
suspended? 
"Ministerial errors in the record, such as misidentification, 
miscalculation of the fine, or errors in the conviction form." 
Redmond, supra., at 669 
''The record indicates DOL erroneously suspended the driver's 
license of one person for eight months after it was misinformed 
by the court that he had been convicted of driving under the 
influence. The record also indicates another person had his 
license erroneously suspended after having been falsely 
identified by the court as the recipient of an unpaid speeding 
ticket." Redmond at 673 
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" ... [M]isidentification, payments credited to the wrong account, 
the failure of the court to provide updated information when 
fines are paid." Redmond at 675 
Davidson himself has experienced ministerial error or inadvertence by court personnel 
related to the suspension of his license. In this very case, no less. When Davidson originally 
pled guilty to DWP his sentence included the suspension of his license. After Davidson 
successfully withdrew his guilty plea, the court, for whatever reason, neglected to send notice 
to I.T.D. to lift the suspension. This caused Davidson to receive a citation for driving on an 
invalid license from the investigating officer who arrived on the scene after Davidson struck a 
deer while driving through Camas County. Luckily, Davidson was able to resolve the matter 
without having to return to Camas County, but it was not without headache. I.T.D. would not 
restore the license without a court order. The Magistrate's clerk had to be contacted, who had 
to send an order to I.T.D. Davidson had to obtain copies to fax to the Camas County Court 
and Prosecutor's office, who agreed to drop the charge with such verification. (See Exhibit 
'C. ') While this is not directly on point, it is illustrative of the very real possibility of 
ministerial error in Idaho's traffic court system. 
The type of error that can happen in the license suspension process that Davidson is 
most concerned about is the error he believed happened in this case: That the infractions he 
was convicted of do not fall under the purview of§ 49-1505. Stated another way, Idaho Code 
did not mandate the suspension of Davidson's license for failure to pay the fines of the 
particular infractions he was convicted of. 
With the above-listed examples of error in mind, we must now proceed to examine 
Rule 11 to see how effective it would be in preventing these types of mistakes from leading to 
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an erroneous suspension: 
Rule 11. (a) Show Cause Hearing. A show cause 
hearing as to whether a defendant's driver's license should be 
suspended for nonpayment of a penalty shall be held by the 
court, ( 1) if a defendant appears in court at the time indicated in 
a Deferred Payment Agreement made under Rule 9(f), or (2) if 
the defendant requests a hearing before the payment date for a 
penalty as authorized under a Notice of Default Judgment 
issued under Rule 8(d), or (3) at any other time in the discretion 
of the court. The show cause hearing shall be an evidentiary 
hearing to determine if the defendant has the complete and 
continuing financial inability to pay the penalty. The defendant 
shall testify under oath and be subject to cross examination. 
A simple reading of the rule demonstrates - quite clearly - that no, this rule would not 
in any way, shape, or form protect a defendant from an erroneous license suspension. Why? 
Because the sole issue to be determined in a Rule 11 hearing is whether or not a defendant has 
a complete and continuing inability to pay the penalty. Rule 11 is essentially a hardship 
provision, and not a process whereby ministerial, legal, or other errors can be brought before 
the court. In State v. Gibbar, 143 Idaho 937, 155 P.3d 1176, 1186 (2006), the Idaho Supreme 
Court held that failure to allow relevant evidence into a suspension hearing would be a 
violation of due process. The U.S. Supreme Court stated in Bell v. Burson, supra., that "[t]he 
hearing required by the Due Process Clause must be 'meaningful,' Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 
U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 1191, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965), and 'appropriate to the nature of 
the case.' Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313, 70 S.Ct. 652, 
657 ( 1950). It is a proposition which hardly seems to need explication that a hearing which 
excludes consideration of an element essential to the decision whether licenses of the nature 
here involved shall be suspended does not meet this standard." One of the elements required 
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for a suspension under § 49-1505 is that the unpaid infraction be related to traffic, an element 
Davidson alleges was not present in his case. Therefore, because its scope is so narrow, Rule 
11 violates the Due Process Clause, since it does not afford a defendant a "meaningful 
hearing," and the risk of an erroneous suspension is very high. So, even if the court had 
complied with § 49-1505 and had sent Davidson a timely notice with opportunity for hearing, 
his right to due process would still have been violated, since the only hearing he could have 
had was an indigency hearing. 
C. RULE 11 WAS WRITTEN IN VIOLATION OF IDAHO CODE§ 49-1505 
The reason Rule 11 was written the way it was seems to be based on a misreading of§ 
49-1505: 
The department shall immediately suspend the driver's license, 
permit and operating privileges of any driver upon receiving 
notice from any court of the state that a person has failed to pay 
the penalty for a traffic infraction judgment. The notice may be 
sent to the department by any court which shall certify that a 
judgment for an infraction not involving a pedestrian or a 
bicycle violation has been entered against the person and that he 
has failed to pay the penalty after notice and hearing, or 
opportunity for hearing, as prescribed by rule of the supreme 
court. No notice of nonnayment of an infraction penalty shall 
be sent to the department if the court finds that the person 
failing to pay the genalty has a complete and continuing 
financial inability to pay the penalty. 
Idaho Code § 49-1505 ( 1) 
It would seem that the drafter of Rule 11 did not properly construe the last two 
sentences of this section. There are two ways to construe these provisions. The first way 
would be to say that the last sentence is a continuation of the thought expressed in the 
previous sentence. The previous sentence speaks of notice and a hearing. What type of 
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hearing? The next line clarifies it: A hearing to determine whether a person has a financial 
inability to pay the penalty. This last sentence modifies the word "hearing" in the previous 
sentence, and limits the scope of that hearing to an indigency hearing. This seems to be the 
conclusion reached by the author of Rule 11. However, this is not a reasonable construction 
under the circumstances. 
The proper construction of these two provisions is that they refer to two separate 
things. The word "hearing" refers to the type of hearing that Davidson has been advocating: 
one where ministerial or legal errors can be brought before the court. The last sentence is 
merely a statutorily created right to use poverty as a defense at the hearing. Absent this 
provision, a defendant would not be able to argue financial hardship, as the court would have 
no authority to waive the penalty on those grounds. Will the State argue that there is some 
sort of logical reason to allow a pre-suspension indigency hearing, but not a pre-suspension 
hearing to correct legal mistakes? Especially when the two issues can and should be 
consolidated into a single hearing? 
If this interpretation is correct, § 49-1505 would be constitutional pursuant to Bell and 
Redmond, but Rule 11 would not be. If this interpretation is incorrect, § 49-1505 would 
violate the constitutional right to a meaningful pre-suspension hearing. Either way, 
Davidson's procedural due process rights have been violated. His license was suspended in 
an unconstitutional manner, and he therefore cannot be convicted of driving without 
privileges. 
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3. 
IDAHO CODE DID NOT EVEN MANDATE A SUSPENSION IN DAVIDSON'S CASE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As shown above, Davidson was denied the right to a meaningful hearing to contest the 
proposed suspension of his license; firstly, since the court did not send him the required 
notice, and secondly, because the court rules only allow for an indigency hearing. The 
violation of Davidson's rights was not hypothetical, and the State can not claim that he was 
not prejudiced, because in fact Davidson had a case he wished to make. If Davidson had 
received the correct notice, and if the rules had allowed for a proper hearing, Davidson would 
have appeared to contest the proposed suspension on the grounds that it was contrary to Idaho 
Code, as demonstrated below. Davidson should not have been convicted of DWP since the 
suspension of his license was statutorily illegal. 
B. NON-MOVING VIOLATIONS ARE Nor INCLUDED WITIDN THE PuRVIEW OF § 49-1505 
Idaho Code § 49-1505 governs the process by which a driver's license can be 
summarily suspended by I.T.D. for failure to pay a fine. It states, in relevant part: 
The department shall immediately suspend the driver's license, 
permit and operating privileges of any driver upon receiving 
notice from any court of the state that a person has failed to pay 
the penalty for a traffic infraction judgment. 
(Emphasis added.) By using the word "traffic," the Legislature intended for this 
section to only apply to moving violations. See Idaho Code§ 49-121 (3): 
"Traffic" means pedestrians, ridden or herded animals, vehicles, 
streetcars and other conveyances either singly or together while 
using any highway for purposes of travel. 
This law implies movement on a highway. A person walking down the street would 
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be considered traffic. A person standing still on the street would not be considered traffic. 
Similarly, a car driving down the street is traffic, while a car parked on the street in not traffic, 
pursuant to the above law. So when Idaho Code§ 49-1505 uses the word traffic, it refers to 
an infraction committed while one is engaged in traffic, i.e. moving down the highway i.e. a 
moving violation. "Traffic infraction" is not a legal term found in Chapter 1, Title 49. The 
two words are defined separately. The definition of "traffic" is seen above, the definition of 
"infraction" is found at § 49-110 ( 5): 
"Infraction" means a civil public offense, not constituting a 
crime, which is not punishable by incarceration and for which 
there is no right to a trial by jury or right to court-appointed 
counsel, and which is punishable by only a penalty not 
exceeding one hundred dollars ($100) and no imprisonment. 
It is not uncommon for state code and the court rules to differentiate between moving 
and non-moving automobile-related infractions. See, i.e., Idaho Infraction Rule 9 (b) 
(5)&(22) (Imposing fewer court costs on non-moving infractions); I.LR. 9 (c) (Allowing 
consolidation of court costs for multiple non-moving infractions); IDAP A 39.02. 71 
(Establishing a "point system" for moving infractions only). 
Therefore, a construction of Idaho Code § 49-1505 which makes it applicable only to 
moving vehicle infractions is the only reasonable interpretation. Davidson was convicted of 
two non-moving infractions (expired license and fictitious plates). Shortly thereafter, the 
court sent a notice of nonpayment to LT.D. Davidson does not know if the notice was sent 
based on ministerial error, or if it was sent because the court defines "traffic" in § 49-1505 
differently than the Appellant. Davidson assumes that the court has given a meaning to word 
"traffic" that would be along the lines of "as having anything to do with automobiles." But 
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this notion can be further dispelled by additional examination of§ 49-1505. 
The department shall immediately suspend the driver's license, 
permit and operating privileges of any driver upon receiving 
notice from any court of the state that a person has failed to pay 
the penalty for a traffic infraction judgment. The notice may be 
sent to the department by any court which shall certify that a 
judgment for an infraction not involving a pedestrian or a 
bicycle violation has been entered against the person and that 
he has failed to pay the penalty after notice and hearing, or 
opportunity for hearing, as prescribed by rule of the supreme 
court ... 
Idaho Code§ 49-1505 (1) 
If the word "traffic" in this section simply means anything automobile related, then 
why did the Legislature in the next line make reference to pedestrians and bicycles? If it is 
self-evident that traffic means "automobile related," then the reference to bicycles and 
pedestrians is useless surplusage. In fact, if it was legislative intent to suspend a driver's 
license for any and all automobile-related infractions, why didn't it simply use the words 
"motor vehicle" instead of "traffic" in § 49-1505? As in, ''The department shall immediately 
suspend the driver's license, permit and operating privileges of any driver upon receiving 
notice from any court of the state that a person has failed to pay the penalty for a motor 
vehicle infraction judgment." If it had been written this way, there would be no question that 
a license could be suspended for moving, non-moving, parking, or any other automobile-
related infractions. Also, if it had been written this way, there would have been no need to 
make a reference to bicycles and pedestrians. They would have been excluded based on the 
very clear definition of "motor vehicle." 
But the fact that the legislature used the word "traffic," followed by "bicycle and 
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pedestrian" is a very clear indication that they were referring to the definition of traffic law at 
§ 49-121 (3) which states that "traffic" is moving down the highway for purposes of travel. A 
car moving down the highway is "traffic." A bicycle moving down the highway is "traffic." 
A person walking down the street is ''traffic." The legislature excluded pedestrian and bicycle 
traffic infractions from the license suspension statute because you don't need a driver's 
license to engage in that form of traffic. 
Many states have nearly identical driving statutes. The State of Washington's version 
of§ 49-1505 is (in relevant part) as follows: 
The department shall suspend all driving privileges of a person 
when the department receives notice from a court ... that the 
person has failed to respond to a notice of traffic infraction, 
failed to appear at a requested hearing, violated a written 
promise to appear in court, or has failed to comply with the 
terms of a notice of traffic infraction or citation, other than for a 
standing, stopping, or parking violation. 
R.C.W. 46.20.289 
The process and structure of this Jaw is very similar to that of Idaho's process. 
However, in this law, the word ''traffic" apparently is used as a synonym for motor vehicle. 
This law clearly applies only to moving violations, because the Washington Legislature 
exempted non-moving violations (standing, stopping, or parking) from its purview. While not 
dispositive, it lends credence to the theory that the Idaho Legislature was also attempting to 
exclude non-moving violations from their license suspension statute. 
Based on the preceding analysis, it is clear that Idaho Code § 49-1505 only authorizes 
the suspension of a driver's license for failure to pay a moving violation, and that Davidson's 
license was suspended illegally. 
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C. THIS CAN BE USED AS A DEFENSE TO A CHARGE OF DRIVING WITHOUT PRIVILEGES 
The question, then, is whether Davidson should be allowed to use the fact that his 
license should not have been suspended as a defense to the charge of DWP. The State will 
likely argue that even if Davidson's interpretation of§ 49-1505 is correct, the defense should 
be considered waived, since Davidson could have attempted to reverse the suspension prior to 
his DWP charge, but did not do so, or failed in attempting. But here, the caselaw is on 
Davidson's side. 
As stated previously, the Washington Supreme Court has held that an individual 
cannot be convicted of DWP if the underlying suspension was in violation of due process. 
State v. Dolson, 138 Wash.2d 773, 783, 982 P.2d 100, 105 (1999) ("An invalid revocation 
cannot later support a conviction for driving with a revoked license, even if [defendant] had 
knowledge of the underlying revocation."); Redmond v. Moore, 151 Wash.2d 664, 670, 91 
P.3d 875, 879 (2004) (" ... a driver cannot be convicted of driving while his or her license is 
suspended or revoked if the suspension or revocation violates due process."); State v. 
Betschart, 2005 WL 1177580, 1-2 (Wash.App. Div. 2). 
In a prosecution for driving without privileges, the State should have the burden to 
prove that the suspension of the defendant's license complied with due process. See State v. 
Storhojf; 133 Wash.2d 523, 946 P.2d 783, 785 (1997); State v. Whitney, 78 Wash.App. 506, 
514, 897 P.2d 374, review denied, 128 Wash.2d 1003, 907 P.2d 297 (1995); City of Seattle v. 
Foley, 56 Wash.App. 485, 488, 784 P.2d 176, review denied, 114 Wash.2d 1016, 791 P.2d 
534 (1990); State v. Baker, 49 Wash.App. 778, 782, 745 P.2d 1335 (1987), statutory 
abrogation recognized by State v. Rogers, 127 Wash.2d 270, 276, 898 P.2d 294 (1995); State 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 22 
v. Thomas, 25 Wash.App. 770, 610 P.2d 937 (1980). 
The Supreme Court of Washington has also held that "[a] challenge to the 
constitutional validity of a predicate conviction which serves as an essential element of a 
charge .. .is not a 'collateral attack' on the prior conviction." State v. Summers, 120 Wn.2d 
801, 810, 846 P .2d 490 ( 1993 ). On intermediate appeal, the District Court judge determined 
that Davidson's due process challenge of the underlying suspension as a defense to DWP 
constituted a "collateral attack." R. Vol. 1, p. 144. A collateral attack, however, may be 
maintained when a final order or judgment is void, not merely erroneous or voidable. 
Bresolin v. Morris, 86 Wash.2d 241, 543 P.2d 325 (1975); Peyton v. Peyton, 28 Wash. 278, 
68 P. 757 (1902). Davidson's due process rights were violated by the manner in which the 
court suspended his license; hence, the suspension is void. There is no collateral attack here. 
The District Court argued that Davidson's failure to avail himself of the post-suspension 
procedures (the very procedures Davidson alleges violate due process) nullifies his ability to 
challenge the license suspension in this case as a defense to DWP. Yet, in Dixon v. Love, 
supra., cited by the District Court, the defendant failed to utilize the post-suspension 
procedures available to him in that case. 431 U.S. at 111. Instead, he filed a civil rights 
action to reinstate his license. Id. The Supreme Court reached the merits of the constitutional 
claim, never holding that such claim was barred by the Appellee's failure to exhaust his 
remedies under the statute. Failure to utilize a deficient process is not a failure to exhaust. 
The Redmond case involved two defendants charged with DWP whose cases were 
consolidated. Both defendants' licenses had been suspended for a period of months when 
they were cited for DWP. Id. at 667. That they had not challenged the suspensions prior to 
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their citations for DWP did not work an estoppel against their due process defense. Even 
though, as the State argued, the defendants could have petitioned the court for relief from a 
suspension due to a clerical error by filing a writ of review, a writ of mandamus, or an 
injunction. The court discounted this. Id. at 676. 
Does a court who erroneously orders that a license be suspended based on an incorrect 
interpretation of a statute commit a violation of due process? Or would it simply be 
considered a statutory violation? And is there a practical difference between the two for our 
purposes here? Even if the court's action does not technically constitute a due process 
violation, the Appellant should still be entitled to use the defense. To hold otherwise would 
only compound the injury to an already innocent motorist. ''This Court has consistently 
recognized that a permit of the nature here involved is a valuable property right and can be 
revoked only in the manner provided by statute." Arrow Transportation Co. v. Idaho Public 
Utilities Commission, 85 Idaho 307, 379 P.2d 422 (1963). The State's failure to comply with 
the law should not be so easily excused by disallowing the introduction of such as a defense to 
DWP. A drivers' license is a valuable right in Idaho. "The right to operate a motor vehicle 
upon the public streets and highways is not a mere privilege. It is a right or liberty, the 
enjoyment of which is protected by the guarantees of the federal and state constitutions." 
Adams v. Pocatello, 91 Idaho 99, 101, 416 P.2d 46, 48 (1966). To disallow such a defense 
against a charge of DWP would impermissibly infringe on the right by creating undue 
hardships, with no corresponding compelling interest by the State. As such, a defense that an 
individual's license should not have been suspended in the first place should be allowed in a 
prosecution for DWP. Davidson has made the requisite showing of the State's error. 
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4. 
IDAHO CODE§ 49-1505 VIOLATES SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In conjunction with the procedural due process defenses enumerated above, Davidson 
also launches a substantive due process challenge to § 49-1505. Substantive due process 
protects against arbitrary and capricious government action even when the decision to take 
action is pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures. McNeely v. State, 119 Idaho 182, 
189, 804 P.2d 911, 918 (1990). For a law or regulation to satisfy due process, it must (1) be 
aimed at achieving a legitimate public purpose, (2) use means that are reasonably necessary or 
rationally related to achieve that purpose, and (3) not be unduly oppressive on individuals. 
See, e.g., Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 14 S.Ct. 499, 38 L.Ed. 385 (1894). Regulations 
imposed upon the right of the citizen to make use of the public highways must have a fair 
relationship to the protection of the public safety in order to be valid. People v. Nothaus, 147 
Colo. 210, 363 P.2d 180 (1961). As Chief Judge Robson said in his dissent in Po/lion v. 
Lewis, 320 F.Supp. 1343, 1356 (N.D.Ill. 1970), vacated and remanded, 403 U.S. 902, 91 S.Ct. 
2212, 29 L.Ed.2d 678 on other grounds, "the method employed for singling out those persons 
who must bear an economic burden not common to the driving public, and who may thus be 
effectively prohibited from owning or driving automobiles, must be rationally related to the 
protection of the public from irresponsible, negligent motorists." (Emphasis added.) The 
suspension of a driver's license for failure to pay an infraction fine fails this test. 
B. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FINE COLLECTION AND HIGHWAY SAFETY 
The state does not license drivers to assure they can extract infraction fines from 
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them; they license drivers to promote highway safety. "The object of the law of the road is to 
prevent or minimize collisions and other accidents." Packard v. O'Neil, 45 Idaho 427,262 P. 
881, 885 (1927). Therefore, suspension of a driver's license for a reason completely unrelated 
to the only legitimate police power justification for the license in the first place violates due 
process. The problem here is that there is not only no "reasonably necessary" relationship 
between road safety and the collection of fines, there is no rational relationship at all. In other 
words, the legitimate end of licensing drivers to promote highway safety does not justify the 
means ofrevoking a driver's license to extract infraction fines. 
Many cases illustrate the necessity of connecting the ground for revocation with the 
purpose of the license. Otherwise the State could simply license every human endeavor 
simply to deter anyone from undesirable conduct of any nature through the threat of license 
revocation. 
C. ST AND ARD OF REVIEW - STRICT SCRUTINY AND RATIONAL BASIS TESTS 
Government may not deprive one of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and 
Article 1, section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. To evaluate whether a statute violates due 
process, the court must first consider the nature of the right affected. If the statute limits a 
fundamental, constitutionally secured right or implicates a suspect class, the standard of 
review is strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny is satisfied only if the State can show that it has a 
compelling interest, and the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve that compelling state 
interest. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 
(1997). "The right to operate a motor vehicle upon the public streets and highways is not a 
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mere privilege. It is a right or liberty, the enjoyment of which is protected by the guarantees of 
the federal and state constitutions." Adams v. Pocatello, 91 Idaho 99, 101, 416 P.2d 46, 48 
( 1966). But how important a right or liberty? Because in today's age the use of an 
automobile is generally necessary for one to earn a living, travel, and pursue happiness, it 
should be considered a fundamental right, since it implicates other fundamental rights. 
However, even if that were not the case, due process requires at least a "rational 
relation" between licensing for driving and revocation for failure to pay infraction fines. The 
only reason to require drivers' licenses is "to make the highways as safe as possible by 
requiring each potential operator to demonstrate a knowledge of rules and regulations of the 
road, a history of compliance with those rules and regulations, and the physical ability to 
safely operate a motor vehicle." State v. Clifford, 57 Wn.App. 127, 132, 787 P.2d 571 (1990). 
Just as initially granting or withholding a driver's license must at least be rationally 
related to promoting the safety of the streets and highways, revocation of that license must 
similarly be necessary to achieve that goal. State v. Hopkins, 109 Wn.App. 558, 564, 36 P.3d 
1080 (2001 ). Drivers' license suspensions should be considered remedial ( i.e. protecting 
highway safety) and not punitive. "[T]he general rule in Washington has long been 'the 
suspension or revocation of a drivers' license is not penal in nature and is not intended as 
punishment, but is designed solely for the protection of the public in the use of the highways." 
State v. McClendon, 131 Wn.2d 853, 868, 935 P.2d 1334 (1997); State v. Griffin, 126 
Wn.App. 700, 705, 109 P.3d 870,873 (2005). 
D. THE STATE'S INTEREST RELATING TO IDAHO CODE§ 49-1505 
Idaho Code § 49-1505 authorizes the suspension of a driver's license if an individual 
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fails to pay a traflic infraction penalty. As shown in a previous section, when the Washington 
Supreme Court analyzed their State's nearly identical provision, it held that "The State's 
interest in suspending an individual's driver's license for failing to appear, pay, or comply with 
a notice of traffic infraction is in the efficient administration of traffic regulations and in 
ensuring offending drivers appear in court, pay applicable fines, and comply with court 
orders ... This interest does not rise to the level of the State's compelling interest in keeping 
unsafe drivers off the roadways. Simply put, failing to resolve a notice of traffic infraction 
does not pose the same threat to public safety as habitually unsafe drivers do." Redmond v. 
Moore, 91 P.3d at 882. It poses no threat, is essentially what the court is saying in this case. 
The State of Idaho does not suspend one's driver's license for committing a single 
traffic infraction, even an unsafe one. It suspends it for failing to pay a fine. So the State is 
willing to tolerate unsafe drivers on the road, but what it will not tolerate is getting stiffed on a 
fine. The purpose ofldaho Code§ 49-1505 is therefore to incentivize drivers to pay the State 
its money owed; it has nothing to do with highway safety whatsoever. 
Are the means necessary to achieve the legitimate purpose? To determine whether the 
means are necessary to achieve the end, we must look to the purpose and lawful justification 
of requiring driver's licenses in the first place, i.e., the license requirement must be justified 
by a legitimate exercise of the police power. Any attempt to revoke the license must similarly 
be tied to that same legitimate exercise of the police power. 
States may require a variety of licensees to protect health, safety, and welfare. 
However, the power to regulate by granting or revoking licenses is not unlimited. To 
legitimately exercise the police power, the means of the regulation must have a real and 
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substantial relation to the legitimate reason for licensing the activity. Chicago, Burlington & 
Quincy Railway. v. Illinois ex rel. Drainage Commissioners, 200 U.S. 561, 593, 26 S.Ct. 341, 
350, 50 L.Ed. 596 (1906). In sum, the police power to revoke licenses must be rationally 
related to the goal or purpose of requiring the particular license in the first place. Montejano 
v. Rayner, 33 F.Supp. 435 (D. Idaho E.D. 1939). 
E. CONCLUSION - IDAHO CODE§ 49-1505 FAILS BOTH TESTS 
People v. Linder, 127 111.2d 174, 180, 535 N.E.2d 829 (1989) applied this principle to 
driver's licenses. There the Illinois Supreme Court struck down a section of the Illinois 
Vehicle Code which required mandatory driver's license suspension of defendants convicted 
of various felonies, including sex and drug offenses. Applying the rational relationship test, 
the court concluded that the means chosen by the Illinois Legislature - license suspension -
was not a reasonable method to accomplish the goal of the licensing statute - the safe and 
legal operation and ownership of motor vehicles: 
"Under the rational-basis test, a "legislative enactment must 
bear a reasonable relationship to the public interest intended to 
be protected, and the means adopted must be a reasonable 
method of accomplishing the desired objective"." 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) ( quoting People v. Wick, 107 Ill.2d 62, 65-66, 481 
N.E.2d 676 (1985).) Accord State v. Gowdy, 64 Ohio Misc.2d 38, 40, 639 N.E.2d 878 (1994) 
(relying on Lindner, 127 Ill.2d 174, holding the statutory provision mandating license 
suspension for drug offenses does not bear a reasonable relationship to the statute's purpose 
of providing for the safe and legal operation and ownership of motor vehicles.) 
In this case, we can see that there is no immediate connection between highway safety 
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and fine enforcement. There are other ways to collect fines absent license suspensions. The 
second prong of the Lawton v. Steele test states that for a law to satisfy due process, it must 
use means that are reasonably necessary to achieve a legitimate public purpose. The State 
cannot argue it "needs"§ 49-1505 to promote highway safety, when other existing procedures 
more effectively accomplish that goal. ID APA 39.02. 71 establishes the "point system" which 
allows the department to suspend the driver's license of an individual who has committed a 
certain number of moving violations. Unlike § 49-1505, the license suspension is directly tied 
to unsafe conduct on the highway, as opposed to the payment of a fine. And while the 
coUection of infraction fines is no doubt a legitimate interest of the State, the Infraction Rules 
already provide for an alternate method of collection: 
Rule 10.2. Forms and procedures for other non-traffic 
infractions. The forms provided for in these Infraction Rules 
and the procedures set forth in these rules for the handling of 
defaults of an infraction shall be modified for non-traffic 
infractions by eliminating references therein to the suspension 
of a driver's license. The judgment shall be sent to the office of 
the prosecuting attorney rather than the Department of 
Transportation. 
Additionally, the State could send the judgment to debt collection companies (which 
they apparently do now), notify credit bureaus, garnish wages and benefits, etc. 
In conclusion, under either a rational basis or strict scrutiny test, Idaho § 49-1505 
violates Davidson's due process rights. A suspension under § 49-1505 is a tool of fine 
enforcement, and not highway safety. Because a driver's license is a valuable right, it cannot 
be taken away without substantive due process. A law that suspends a license that bears no 
relationship to highway safety is unreasonable, and cannot stand under the 14th Amendment 
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5. 
lNEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Substantively, Davidson could not receive effective counsel, because the Ada County 
public defender system lacks the resources necessary to deliver service at a level required by 
the Sixth Amendment. The National Legal Aid & Defender Association recently published a 
comprehensive report on the inadequacies ofldaho's public defender system. The report can 
be found at www.nlada.net/sites/default/files/id guaranteeofcounseljseri0 1-2010 report.pd[, 
and Davidson hereby requests that the Court take notice of it. Among the report's findings: 
"NLADA finds that the state of Idaho fails to provide the level of representation required by 
our Constitution for those who cannot afford counsel in its criminal and juvenile courts." 
A. PUBLIC DEFENDER KEVIN ROGERS 
The Appellant's first public defender, Kevin Rogers of the Ada County Public 
Defender's Office, refused to provide a legal defense or to file a motion to dismiss, despite 
substantial authority for such a defense. He also gave the Davidson legally incorrect 
information which caused him to plead guilty to the charge. Davidson was forced - by 
himself and without the assistance of counsel - to file and argue a motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea. The extent of the ineffectiveness is detailed in the motion, R. Vol. I, p. 16, and in 
the supporting affidavit, which was not included in the record (Davidson will attempt to enter 
it into the record.) Davidson also filed a petition for post conviction relief alleging the same 
facts. Defender Rogers filed a response. See Exhibit 'F.' While obviously it is Davidson's 
word against Rogers,' Davidson attests that the response is plagued with lies and 
exaggerations, and was calculated to prejudice Davidson in the eyes of the court. Such a 
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response violated the attorney's responsibility to the client. Even if taken at face value, it 
contains enough mistaken propositions of law and demonstrates enough lack of preparation to 
show ineffective assistance of counsel. Milburn v. State, 130 Idaho 649, 946 P.2d 71 (1997). 
B. PuBLIC DEFENDER RANDALL BARNUM 
The Court then assigned Davidson a new public defender, Randall Barnum, a private 
practice attorney. Mr. Barnum also provided ineffective assistance to the Appellant. On one 
occasion, Davidson forgot to attend a pre-trial conference. Despite the fact that Mr. Barnum 
was there, he never telephoned Davidson to inform him that he needed to be at that hearing. 
This caused a bench warrant to be issued for his arrest. When Davidson questioned Mr. 
Barnum as to why he did not call him, Mr. Barnum replied that he did not have his phone 
number, despite the fact that the Appellant's phone number was on numerous documents in 
the case file. While not dispositive of the issue, it demonstrates an absolute disinterest in 
being a "zealous advocate" for his client. State v. Robinson, 555 S.W.2d 667 (1977). 
Like the first public defender, Mr. Barnum refused to provide the Appellant with a 
legal defense or to file a motion to dismiss. He failed to properly investigate Davidson's legal 
theories before claiming that he would not file a motion to dismiss. Mr. Barnum made it clear 
that he would not file a motion to dismiss for the Appellant because he thought the defense 
was frivolous. Davidson provided him with a copy of Redmond v. Moore, supra., a very 
persuasive case from Washington that was on all fours with the Appellant's case. He then 
provided the Appellant with a different Washington case that was factually different to justify 
his conclusion. (Amunrud v. Board of Appeals, 158 Wn.2d 208 (2006).) (See Exhibit 'D. ') 
When the Appellant later questioned Mr. Barnum, it became clear that he had not even read 
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the case that the Appellant was relying on for his defense. In a subsequent letter to Davidson, 
Mr. Barnum still claimed, without any serious analysis, that he would not file a motion to 
dismiss because the defense lacked merit. To say that there exists no legal defense to 
Davidson's charge stains credibility. Even if the particular defense Davidson advocated was 
frivolous, there may have been other defenses that could have been discovered by a trained 
attorney. The only legal research done by either attorney seemed to have been done for the 
purpose of getting out of having to prepare a legal motion. Barnum, ironically, in trying to 
show Davidson he had no case, gave him a great defense argument on substantive Due 
Process by sending him the Amunrnd case. Even though the due process argument in 
Amunrnd lost 6 - 3, there was obviously a chance that a majority of the Idaho Supreme Court 
would swing the other way. Banuelos v. State, 127 Idaho 860,908 P.2d 162 (Ct.App.1995). 
Mr. Barnum has since withdrawn from this case. It was not Davidson's intention to 
waive the right of counsel. The Appellant still desired to have the assistance of counsel. 
However, it became apparent that the public defender system was not interested in anything 
other than negotiating a plea bargain. Beasley v. State, 126 Idaho 356, 883 P.2d 714 
(Ct.App.1994). Curless v. State, 146 Idaho 95, 190 P.3d 914 (2008). 
The Court should declare that the Appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel, 
and that, under current circumstances, the public defender's office is not equipped to do any 
actual research and writing that would be necessary for the type of defense the Appellant 
needs. In other words, it is not possible for the Appellant, or any other Appellant, who needs 
a well written and researched memorandum, to receive one from the public defender's office. 
This Court should therefore dismiss the Appellant's charge on Sixth Amendment grounds. 
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6. 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN SENDING DAVIDSON TO JAIL 
A. SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
On June 16, 2009, Davidson appeared before the court for sentencing. He requested to 
enter a conditional plea of guilty for the purpose of appealing the denial of his motion to 
dismiss. See Transcript, Vol. 2, p. 2, L. 20.4 The court accepted the conditional plea. Tr. 
Vol. 2, p. 3, L. 19. The court sentenced Davidson to a 180 day license suspension, Tr. Vol. 2, 
p. 7, L. 3, but offered to delay its implementation for three weeks so that Davidson could file 
for a temporary restricted permit. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 7, L. 12. Davidson motioned for a stay 
pending the outcome of the appeal, but the court would not accept an oral motion, stating, "I 
think that has to be a written motion filed with the Court to do so." Tr. Vol. 2, p. 7, L. 25. 
After other discussion, the court then sentenced Davidson to three days in jail. The court 
ordered Davidson to immediately begin serving his jail sentence, Tr. Vol. 2, p. 10, L. 18, and 
stated that once he had filed a written motion for a stay he would entertain it. Davidson 
moved for a one-day stay of execution so that he could write up a motion to stay execution 
pending the outcome of his appeal. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 10, L. 22. The court denied the motion, 
stating that a written motion would have had to have been filed prior to the event. Tr. Vol. 2, 
p. 11, L. 1. After non-related discussions, Davidson again moves the court to stay the 
execution of the jail sentence, this time for a few minutes, so that he could write out a motion 
on the spot. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 12, L. 8. The court denies the motion, stating: 
4 Two separate transcripts from Magistrate Court hearings are included as exhibits in this appeal to the 
Supreme Court. (One may have an incorrect date on the cover.) For purposes of this brief, the transcript from 
the April 23 hearing will be cited as "Volume I" and the transcript from the June 16 hearing will be "Volume 2." 
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''Well, all I can tell you is that there are certain requirements 
under Rule 11 and I'm simply following the letter of the law 
here that requires that, whether it is - I understand the practical 
effect in your case, but that's the way that the - the manner in 
which the rule is written up and I think I'm bound to follow it." 
Tr. Vol. 2, p. 13, L. 3 
"But, like I said, I think that's the requirement that I have to 
follow here." 
Tr. Vol. 2, p. 13, L. 20 
The court then has Davidson arrested by the marshal and taken into custody. The 
court promises Davidson -twice- that if he files his plea from jail, it will be acted upon 
immediately. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 10, L. 18 & p. 13, L. 11. Despite the fact that Davidson was able 
to get both a written conditional plea and a motion for an immediate stay of execution to the 
Judge's office on his second day of incarceration, the Judge apparently broke his promise, as 
the proposed order was not signed for approximately two weeks, and Davidson was forced to 
serve the entire jail sentence. This immediate remand of Davidson into custody constituted an 
abuse of discretion by the Magistrate Judge. 
The judge, through comments at the hearing, appeared to make the following rulings: 
1) That if an individual fails to put their conditional plea in writing, they must 
immediately begin serving their sentence after the plea is orally taken, pursuant to Rule 11. 
2) That a motion for a stay of execution of sentence pending the outcome of a 
conditional appeal cannot be given orally to the court, and must be in writing. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 35 
8. ABUSE OF DISCRETION ST AND ARDS 
In order to evaluate a claim of abuse of discretion, the reviewing court must analyze: 
(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the 
trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal 
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court 
reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Sun Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. Idaho 
Power Co., 119 ldaho 87, 94,803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). 
C. ABUSE OF DISCRETION DEMONSTRATED 
The lower court, in immediately remanding Davidson to jail despite his objection, 
stated that ''there are certain requirements under Rule 11 and I'm simply following the letter 
of the law ... " The section of Rule 11 that deals with conditional pleas is as follows: 
(2) Conditional Pleas. With the approval of the court and the 
consent of the prosecuting attorney, a defendant may enter a 
conditional plea of guilty reserving in writing the right, on 
appeal from the judgment, to review any specified adverse 
ruling. If the defendant prevails on appeal, the defendant shall 
be allowed to withdraw defendant's plea. 
Idaho Criminal Rule 11 (a) (2) 
While this section does require a conditional plea to be in writing, and while it is true 
that Davidson did not have his plea in writing at the time he entered it orally, there is nothing 
here to indicate that a defendant must be immediately placed in custody to serve a sentence if 
they failed to have their paperwork submitted in time. An examination of the rest of Rule 11 
shows no requirement for immediate remand. In fact, a review of other court rules shows that 
judges have broad and wide-reaching discretion when it comes to deciding when a defendant 
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will have to serve their sentence. See, e.g., I.C.R. 33 (a)(l) (After a plea or verdict of 
guilty ... the court must appoint a time for pronouncing judgment and sentence ... ) I.C.R. 38 (b) 
(The judgment of imprisonment shall be stayed if an appeal is taken and the defendant is 
admitted to bail.) I.C.R. 46 (b) (A defendant may be admitted to bail or released upon 
defendant's own recognizance by the court in which defendant was convicted pending an 
appeal...) I.C.R. 54.5 (a) (Execution of the sentence, if any, imposed by the trial court, shall 
be stayed ... when ordered by the magistrate ... ) M.C.R. 6 (b) (If the defendant enters a plea of 
guilty, the court may thereupon impose the sentence or may appoint a later time for imposing 
sentence.) Clearly, the judge had discretion to grant Davidson time in which to write out a 
conditional plea. Rule 11 (b) says, "With the approval of the court and the consent of the 
prosecuting attorney, a defendant may enter a conditional plea ... " This rule gives the 
impression that an informal sidebar or conference with the prosecutor should take place 
during the sentence hearing so that the two sides can hash out agreeable conditions. Here, the 
court could have simply told Mr. Davidson to get with the prosecutor and write out a 
conditional plea, which could have even been on a pre-printed, court-supplied plea form. 
(Which would have taken all of three minutes to fill out.) The court also clearly had authority 
to set another sentence hearing for another date in order to allow Davidson the time to write 
out his own conditions at home and submit them later. Strangely, the court seemed to 
perceive other sentencing issues as discretionary. The court both waived the fine m 
Davidson's case, Tr. Vol. 2, p. 9, L. 19, and offered to delay the start of the license suspension 
so that Davidson could file a request for a temporary restricted permit. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 7, L. 13. 
Why the court did not feel a similar discretion was available regarding the jail sentence is 
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unknown. 
Because the court did not correctly perceive the issue of Davidson's sentencing as one 
of discretion, and because the court incorrectly thought that Rule 11 mandated actions which 
it did not, the court committed an abuse of discretion. 
Secondly, the court committed an abuse of discretion when it would not accept an oral 
motion for a stay of execution pending the outcome of the conditional appeal. Idaho Criminal 
Rule 47 states: 
An application to the court for an order shall be by motion. A 
motion other than one made during a trial or hearing shall be in 
writing unless the court permits it to be made orally ... ) 
So primarily, we see that in general, motions can be made orally during hearings. The 
Appellant is unable to find any conflicting rules that mandate motions for stays be in writing 
and filed before sentencing. "Execution of the sentence, if any, imposed by the trial court, 
shall be stayed [pending appeal] ... when ordered by the magistrate ... " I.C.R. 54.5. The court 
clearly had discretion to entertain an oral motion for stay of execution, and no rule appears to 
require such motions to be in writing. 
Therefore, when the Magistrate Judge stated, "You are able to do that, but... I think 
that has to be a written motion filed with Court to do so," in response to Davidson's motion 
for a stay, the Judge abused his discretion, since he did not believe he had any discretion to 
rule on an oral motion. State v. Currington, 108 Idaho 539, 700 P .2d 942 ( 1985). Associates 
Northwest, Inc., v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603,605, 733 P.2d 824, 826 (1987). The Judge signed a 
proposed written stay order weeks after sentencing. The Judge should have granted 
Davidson's oral motion at hearing, to spare him three days of incarceration. 
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7. 
DAVIDSON IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES 
The many courts seem to take no great shame in bludgeoning pro se defendants with 
the policy that they are to be held to the same standards as attorneys, and are not excused from 
adhering to the myriad of procedural rules. See, e.g., Golay v. Loomis, 118 Idaho 387, 797 
P.2d 95 (1990). Very well, then this standard should apply equally to all the rules. Indigent 
defendants are entitled to counsel paid for by the State. If such a defendant chooses to 
represent himself, he should also be compensated by the State for the time spent preparing his 
defense. This should apply with extreme particularity to the immediate case, where the state-
appointed attorneys absolutely refused to provide Davidson with a defense. Win or lose the 
appeal, Davidson should be entitled to fees and reasonable expenses pursuant to LC. § 19-860 
et. seq .. State v. Powers, 96 Idaho 833, 537 P.2d 1369 (1975). Equal protection demands it. 
If Davidson prevails on any constitutional issues in this case, he should be entitled to 
an award of attorney fees under the Private Attorney General Doctrine. Serrano v. Priest, 141 
Cal.Rptr. 315, 569 P.2d 1303, 12-16 (1977); Hellar v. Cenarrnsa, 106 Idaho 571, 682 P.2d 
524 ( 1984). While the doctrine was created for use in civil cases, there is no rational reason 
why it shouldn't be extended to criminal cases, if a prevailing defendant can meet the same 
three-prong criteria. Because, under the doctrine, an unwritten attorney I client relationship 
exists between the litigant and the general public, a pro se litigant is entitled to collect the fee. 
Davidson turned down a plea bargain - wherein his sentence would have been a small 
fine with no jail time - in order to spend countless hours at a cost of thousands of dollars in 
lost opportunity, so as to prosecute this appeal, because it was in the public's interest to do so. 
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IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above arguments, Davidson's charge of driving without privileges 
should be dismissed by this Court. Finally, whether or not he prevails on this appeal, the 
Appellant requests a finding by this Court that the defenses as enumerated in this brief are 
based on law, and are not frivolous or without merit. 
/ / 
1~~ Davidson, Pro Se 
/ / . C~n behalf ofH1mself 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Ryan Davidson, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the "Appellant's 
Brief' was sent to the following individuals by hand delivery: 
IDAHO ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE 
700 W. Jefferson Street, Suite 210 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
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Davidson, Pro Se 
behalf of Himself 
EXHIBITS 
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IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT 
Driver Services • P.O. Box 7129 
Boise ID 83707 -1129 
(208) 334-8735 
dmv.idaho.gov 
624 
DAVIDSON, RYAN THOMAS 
I EXHIBIT 'A' I 
80355 
PHONE: (208) 334-8736 
AUGUST 28, 2007 
80355 
121 E 36TH 
GARDEN CITY ID 83714 
LIC/IDENT NO: ZB184175C 
FILE NUMBER: 807016627801 
DATE OF BIRTH: 
NOTICE OF SUSPENSION 
ACCORDING TO THE NOTICE FROM THE COURT, YOU HAVE FAILED TO PAY THE 
PENALTY FOR AN INFRACTION JUDGMENT IDAHO CODE 49-1505. 
IN THE COURT OF: ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE BOISE CITY TRAFFIC COURT 
200 W FRONT ST BOISE ID 83702 
(208)287-6900 
DEFAULT DATE:JULY 23, 2007 CITATION ISSUE DATE:JUNE 04, 2007 
CASE/CITATION#: T0724995.0l.001/0166278-0l 
VIOLATION: EXPIRATION/RENEWAL OPER/CHAUFFER LICENSE 
COSTS: $86.00 
UNDER IDAHO CODE 49-1505, YOUR DRIVING PRIVILEGES ARE BEING WITHDRAWN 
FOR 90 DAYS, EFFECTIVE SEPTEMBER 17, 2007 THROUGH DECEMBER 16, 2007 . 
PLEASE SURRENDER ANY IDAHO DRIVER'S LICENSE IN YOUR POSSESSION. 
YOUR DRIVING PRIVILEGES MAY BE REINSTATED AS SOON AS YOU PROVIDE PROOF 
THAT THE INFRACTION PENALTY HAS BEEN PAID TO THE ABOVE COURT, IDAHO 
CODE 49-1505, AND PAY A REINSTATEMENT FEE, IDAHO CODE 49-328, TO THIS 
OFFICE. 
THE REINSTATEMENT FEE WILL BE WAIVED IF YOU CAN SHOW PROOF THAT THE 
PENALTY WAS PAID PRIOR TO (BEFORE) THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE 
SUSPENSION. IT IS YOUR RESPONSIBILITY TO ENSURE THAT PROOF OF PAYMENT 
GENERATED BY THE COURT IS RECEIVED BY THIS OFFICE. 
YOUR PRIVILEGE TO DRIVE IS NOT EFFECTIVE UNTIL YOU HAVE RECEIVED 
CONFIRMATION OF REINSTATEMENT FROM THIS OFFICE. 
ENCLOSURE: REINSTATEMENT BILLING 
"//4u,(/~------
Edward R. Pemble 
Driver Services Manager 
0001545 
DAVIDSPN RYANT () I EXHIBIT'B' I G) 8/09/2007 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, ADA COUNTY, MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
DAVIDSON RYANT 
121 E 36TH 
200 West Front Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
(208) 287-6900 
NOT ON CITE ,ID 83714-0000 CITATION#: 
Defendant. CASE NO 
166278 
T0724995. 1. 1. 
DOB: SEX: 
DL or SSN: 
VEH LIC: 
M 
ID 
ID 
N 
NOTICE OF NONPAYMENT/ 
NONCOMPLIANCE OF 
INFRACTION PENALTY 
COMM VEH: N HAZ MATL: 
,. 
TO: THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, STATE OF IDAHO 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a traffic judgment was entered 
against the above named defendant on Jul 23, 2007 for the 
,infraction of EXPIRATION/RENEWAL OPER CHAUFFER LICENSE 
issued on' June 4, 2007 for the penalty of$ 86.00 
and that said defendant was given until July 23, 2007 
and has failed and refused to pay the penalty. 
After notice of· judgment and opportunity for hearing. 
After hearing and finding by the Court that the defendant 
does not have a complete and continuing financial 
inability to pay the penalty. 
YOU ARE THEREFORE REQUESTED to immediately suspend the 
driver's license of the defendant as provided by law or notify the 
Defendant's home state pursuant to the interstate Nonresident 
Violator Compact. 
Dated AUG 2 2 2007 
By ANNA MORGAN 
Deputy Clerk Rev: 5/04 
Ryan Davidson 
121 E. 36th Street 
Garden City, ID 83714 
(208) 353-8157 
Ryan. Davidson(a), li bertynet. us 
November 18, 2008 
I EXHIBIT 'C' I 
Attn: Korrie, Camas County Court Clerk 
Re: Citation No. 7112 
On October 20, 2008, I was driving through Camas County when I hit a deer on the 
highway. The investigating officer ran my information through the system and informed me that 
I was driving with an invalid license. He issued me a misdemeanor citation (No. 7112) with an 
appearance date of November 7, 2008. I inadvertently forgot to attend this hearing. As I 
understand it, as of yesterday, a warrant had not yet issued in this case. 
With respect to my driver's license, it was neither invalid nor suspended at the time of the 
above incident. The history is as follows: Earlier in the year I was convicted of Driving Without 
Privileges, and as part of the sentence, the Fourth District Court ordered my license to be 
suspended for six months. However, because I had received incorrect advice from a public 
defender, I filed a motion to withdraw my guilty plea. This motion was granted on May 5th, 
2008, and the sentence was set aside. 
At this point, the court should have sent an order to the Idaho Transportation Department 
rescinding the suspension. Apparently, this never happened. As a result, D.O.T. records 
indicated that my licensed was suspended or invalid for the last several months, when in fact it 
was not. 
I have finally resolved the matter with the I.T.D. They contacted the judge's clerk, who 
faxed them a copy of an order setting aside the sentence. The I.T.D. finally corrected their 
records, and now shows my license as valid. 
I spoke with the Camas County Prosecutor's office in Gooding, and they informed me 
that if I faxed the relevant documents to the Camas Court the charge would be dismissed. 
Therefore, along with this letter, I am sending four additional documents which show that the 
license suspension was set aside in May. If you require any additional information, please 
contact me at the number above, or contact Magistrate Judge Watkins' clerk at 287-7631, or 
contact Marilyn from I.T.D. at 334-8735. 
Thank you for your assistance in this matter, and please let me know the status of this 
situation by mail. 
Sincerely, 
GRitol Law 
GROUP, PU.C 
C.TomAltwosh.J.D.t 
Allan R. Boldl, J.D .• 
C.P.A., A.P.A.t 
David 0. Ballard. J.O. 
Jay J. K.iiha,J.O .. 1.LM. • 
llmdall S. Barnum, J.O. 
DanidA. Nc"alil.J.D., M.B.A. 
Affldo L Roa, J.D. •• 
David A. Heida, J.D. 
lbaaaA.Manm.J.D.••• 
Roy Lewis Eiprcn. J.D.t 
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I EOtlBIT 'D' I 
Ryan Davidson 
121 E. 36111 Street 
Garden City, ID 83714 
July 22, 2008 
RE: State of Idaho v. Ryan Davidson 
Ada County Case No.: CR-MD-2007-16222 
Dear Mr. Davidson, 
Enclosed please find a copy of Idaho Code § 49-1505 and Amunrud v. Board 
of Appeals, a case from the Supreme Court of Washington. 
After reviewing all of the information you previously provided to my office, 
it is my opinion that your case is distinguished from the opinion you provided 
regarding due process and drivers license suspensions. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 49-
1505, you have an adminilltrative remedy available. Moreover, you exercised all 
available processea by requesting a show cause hearing and filing an appeal. 
Although you exhausted all available processes, that you did not obtain the relief 
sought does not create a due process violation. Accordingly, I do not believe I am 
able to ethically file a Motion to Dismiss aa you previously requested. However, if 
you wish to discuss this matter, please contact my secretary, Stacie, and schedule an 
appointment to meet with me in my office. 
Thank you for your attention to this correspondence. If you have questions 
or concerns regarding this letter or your case, you may contact me at my office. 
RSB/smd 
Encl. 
Sincerely, 
July 29, 2008 
Dear Mr. Barnum, 
Re: Case No. CR-MD-2007-16222 
I am in receipt of your letter dated July 22, 2008, in which you state that you do not 
believe that you are able to ethically file a Motion to Dismiss. 
I find your response troubling. When I first discussed this matter with yo~ I requested 
that you read the Redmond v. Moore decision out of Washington state, a case on all fours 
with my situation. You stated that you did not wish to investigate out-of-state precedents 
if local precedents were available. Then, in your response letter to me, you include a 
copy Amunrud v. Board of Appeals, another Washington state case, which has nothing in 
common with the facts or law of my own case. 
You should be aware that I am an experienced pro se litigant, and have argued and won 
my own cases in front of the Idaho Supreme Court and the federal courts. I am not 
ignorant in the law, and have researched my own case enough to know that I have a 
viable defense. The fact that you have come to an opposite conclusion shows me that 
either you have failed to conduct the necessary amount of research, or that you are 
playing the same game that my original public defender did, which is simply 
manufacturing an excuse as to why my defense is not meritorious, in order to keep from 
having to write a brief. 
In either event, it is apparent that I will have to carefully spell out the basics of my 
defense to yo~ so that there will be no question as to its validity. 
Firstly, if you have not already done so, read the Redmond v. Moore decision for the 
proposition that a license cannot be suspended without notice and opportunity for hearing 
for failure to pay a traffic infraction. 
The facts of my case were as follows: I was found guilty at trial of committing two 
infractions. I did not pay them. I should not have received a notice of license 
suspension, since the two infractions were not "traffic" infractions, which is required 
under LC.§ 49-1505. (The definition of "traffic" is found at LC.§ 49-121 (3).) 
Nevertheless, I received a notice of suspension. As you can see from the notice I 
provided you, no mention is made that an individual has the right to contest the 
suspension on any grounds. Yes, Idaho Code does provide for various appeals, however, 
that fact is not disclosed on the notice of suspension. The two prongs of due process are 
notice and hearing. While the hearings provided for in Idaho Code may satisfy due 
process, the lack of notice on the suspension letter renders the process in violation of 
procedural due process. The fact that I may have tried to avail myself of those appeal 
procedures after the license was suspended is irrelevant, as I had no notice of those 
procedures prior to suspension. Indeed, any relief I sought was denied on the grounds 
that I had not sought it in a timely fashion pursuant to law. This is one of the many issues 
discussed in the Redmond decision. 
Now then, the first major argument in this case is that the procedure used by the courts 
and the DOT is a violation of due process based on the holdings of the Redmond court. 
However, a closer examination of Idaho Code § 49-1505 reveals that it was most likely 
the intent of the legislature to grant the same due process protections as provided for in 
Redmond. It provides, "The department shall immediately suspend the drivers' 
license ... after notice and hearing, or opportunity for hearing, as prescribed by rule of the 
supreme court." This language can be interpreted as requiring the same type of 
procedures that the Washington Supreme Court required in Redmond - namely, that if the 
court or the DOT wishes to suspend a drivers' license, they must send you a notice which 
notifies you of your right to request a hearing. 
As I was not given proper notice, my DWP cannot stand under a due process challenge. 
Either the DOT or the supreme court has failed to meet the legislature's requirements, as 
they have set up a system of processing that violates due process. 
One glaring glitch in their system is that while they do send nearly proper notices to those 
drivers who fail to pay their tickets, or who schedule tnais but then do not show up, they 
do not send notices to those who schedule trials, appear, but then lose, as is what 
happened in my case. Therefore, this entire case can probably be chalked up to a minor 
omission by whoever drafted the rules. 
There are other considerations in this case, but what I have outlined above would 
constitute the central theme of my defense. 
I strongly encourage you to study the above and begin working on a proper defense. I 
seriously doubt that there is a judge in this state who would conclude that the above 
research ( even if it failed at hearing) was frivolous or without merit. I expect you to 
fulfill your role as my public defender. If you fail to do so, I will be filing a complaint 
with the state bar, and will request that the judge in this case issue sanctions against you. 
If you have any questions about the above information, please contact me. If you intend 
on filing any motions with the court related to the above defense, I would insist upon 
reading them prior to their being filed. 
Sincerely, 
Ryan T. Davidson 
121 E. 36th Street 
Garden City, ID 83714 
353-8157 
Ryan.Davidson@LibertyNet.us 
0 2itol Law Randall S. Barnum 
Group, PLLC \vww.capitollawgroup.net • rbarnum(~g.capitollawgroup.net 
October 28, 2008 
Ryan Davidson 
121 E. 3 6th Street 
Garden City, ID 83714 
RE: State olldaho v. Ryan Davidson 
Ada County Case No.· CR-MD-2007-16222 
CLG /Ue number 8002. 078 
Dear Mr. Davidson, 
On October 28, 2008, I appeared on your behalf before Judge Watkins for a pretrial conference for 
the above-referenced matter. On July 31, 2008, I sent you a letter with the date and time of this pretrial 
conforence. However, you were not present today for your hearing. As such, the Court issued a bench 
warrant for your arrest, with bond set in the amount of $1,000.00. 
After your hearing, I spoke with the Boise City Attorney assigned to your case. Ms. Flemming 
offered to reduce your charge to an Invalid License, a misdemeanor violation of Idaho Code section 49-
301. AdditionaHy, you would be required to pay a $150.00 fine plus court costs in the amount of $75.50. 
Moreover, Ms. Flemming agreed she would stipulate to quash the bench warrant and that she would not 
bring an additional charge for your failure to appear at your pretrial conference. If you would like to take 
advantage of this offer, please contact my secretary, Stacie, and I will prepare the necessary paperwork. 
Thank you for your attention to this correspondence. If you have questions or concerns regarding this 
letter or your case, you may contact me at my office. 
Sincerely, 
~pit/~~ 
I 
Randall S. Barnum 
225 N. 9th Street. Ste. 210, PO Box 2598. Boise. ID 83701-2598 • Tel: (208) 344.8990 • Fax: (208) 344.9140 
0 2itol Law Randall S. Barnum 
Group, PLLC www.capitollawgroup.net • rbamum@capitollawgroup.net 
Ryan Davidson 
121 E. 36th Street 
Garden City, ID 83714 
RE: State of Idaho v. Ryan Davidson 
January 26, 2009 
Ada County Case No.: CR-MD-2007-16222 
CLG file number 8002.078 
Dear Mr. Davidson, 
On January 23, 2009 I appeared with you before Judge Watkins for a hearing in the above-referenced 
matter. At that hearing, it became apparent that the Court was not prepared. Accordingly, Judge 
Watkins rescheduled your case for a pretrial conference on Monday, February 9, 2009 at 8: 15 o'clock 
a.m. At the conclusion of your hearing, you and I discussed further proceedings in your case. At your 
request, I reviewed CITY OF REDMOND V lv!OORE, and still do not believe a motion to dismiss is 
appropriate for your case. 
Idaho Code Section 49-1505( 6) provides for an expedited appeal to any driver who receives a notice 
of non payment from the Court. This hearing removes the possibility of ministerial errors. I do not 
believe the statute complained of in the case sited above contained these same protections as the Idaho 
statute. Accordingly, I will not file a motion to dismiss. However, if you wish to proceed pro se, 1 will 
discuss the matter with the Court at your next hearing and ask that you be allowed to represent yourself. 
Thank you for your attention to this correspondence. If you have questions or concerns regarding this 
letter or your case, you may contact me at my office. 
RSB/smd 
Encl. 
Sincerely, 
70~ Nnrth 10th <;tre-t>t <;te- JOO PO Rm, ?~Ql! R.ni~,- rn l!,701-?~QS! • T,.J, /?OSI\ ,,Li S!QQO • IO"~v· {")fll!\ 1,1,1 OUll 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Ryan T Davidson 
121 E 36th 
Garden City, ID 83714 
Defendant. 
DOB: SEX: M 
DL: ID 
CDL: 
VEH LIC: ID 
COMM VEH: No 
HAZ MATL: No 
200 W FRONT ST RM 1190 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702 
(208) 287-6900 
Citation No: 1239676-(1) 
Case No: CR-IN-2009-0051951 
NOTICE OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT/ 
NONCOMPLIANCE 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, to the above Defendant that judgment by default was entered against you on 
Monday, .A.prH 12, 2010, for the infraction of: 149-644 Driving-Turn Required Position and Method of Turning, 
issued on 10/31/2009 for the penalty of $75.00. 
NOTICE IS FURTHER GIVEN, that if you do not pay this penalty by mail or in person by Monday, April 26, 
2010, your driver's license will be suspended by the Idaho Transportation Department or your home 
state pursuant to the interstate Nonresident Violator Compact. Driving with a suspended license is a criminal 
misdemeanor, which carries a JAi L PENAL TY in the State of Idaho. 
You may pay this penalty in person or by mail at the following address: 
Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County 
200 W Front St Rm 1190 
Boise, 10 83702 
(208) 287-6900 
You have the right to appear before the clerk BEFORE the payment date and request a court hearing to show 
cause why your license should not be suspended for failure to pay the penalty. 
Mailed to the Defendant this date. 
--
Notice of Default Judgment/Noncompliance 
Dated: Monday, April 12, 2010 
A. MORGAN 
Deputy Clerk 
oddoc02.rtf 
I EXHIBIT 'I!' I 
I EXHIBIT 'P I 
Response to Ryan Davidson's Petition 
By Kevin Rogers 
Summary: On November 29, 2007 at 2300 hours, Mr. Davidson was stopped for ice 
obstructing his windshield. He produced a driver's license which appeared to be valid. 
However upon checking with Dispatch, Officer Christensen discovered that Mr. 
Davidson's driver's privileges had been suspended 2x from 09/17/2007 to 12/16/2007. 
He was arrested for DWP and Failure to Provide Insurance. His Case No. is M07016222. 
Boise City Prosecutor, Jim Wickham was the Prosecutor. Wickham's direct line is 384-
3880. Mr. Davidson told me that he had "gone to court" for 2 citations, Fictitious Plates, 
and Failure to Renew Driver's License and had "lost." I asked him why he had been 
suspended and Mr. Davidson told me "because I just didn't want to pay the fines. I 
wanted to appeal my original suspensions because I did not receive a separate 
administrative hearing prior to the Court suspending my driving privileges." Mr. 
Davidson admitted to me that he was driving the car with knowledge that he was 
suspended. Mr. Davidson did not want to have a jury trial on DWP because he said 
"there ?re no factual issues," but wanted a court trial. He instructed me to appeal his 
initial, administrative license suspensions by filing with the Magistrate Court a Motion to 
Dismiss, saying "I shouldn't have been suspended in the first place." Alternatively, Mr. 
Davidson told me to plead him guilty to DWP, reserving the right to appeal his original, 
administrative suspension. I did not have copies in the file of his prior conviction for 
DWP, but the prosecutor's file indicated a prior suspension for DWP from 07/30/2001 to 
01/26/2002. I asked Mr. Davidson to tell me how many prior convictions he had and he 
told me "only one.'' I asked Mr. Davidson to provide me with copies of all the 
correspondence to/from the DOT, but I never received anything from Mr. Davidson. On 
the day of trial, Mr. Wickham seemed to believed that he could amend to a 2nd offense 
because of a prior conviction elsewhere, but did not show this to me. I agreed with Mr. 
Davidson that if his conviction were outside the 5 year period, that he could not be tried 
for a 2nd offense, but that it would not prevent the State from trying. I told him that every 
time the Legislature meets they seem to draft longer statutes of limitations and more 
draconian penalties and I knew that the DUI law had been amended to make the "look 
back" period 10 years and I didn't think the DWP look back had been lengthened, but 
"that I'd have to look to be sure it wasn't also 10 years." I told Mr. Davidson that even if 
the State could not prove the conviction elsewhere, they would take their "standard 2nd 
lifetime recommendation" of 5 days ACJ (60/55), a $200 + cc fine ($500/$300) and 180 
day DLS "off the table" ifhe did not plead guilty to DWP 1st, "inasmuch as you've 
admitted to me that you knew you were driving with knowledge of your suspension," I 
told him. On the morning of his jury trial setting, I explained to Mr. Davidson that 
Redmond v. Moore, (citations omitted) were not controlling in Idaho, that Idaho's 
Infraction Rules "Administrative Rules, I called them," provided notice to him of the 
penalties he could suffer if he did not pay his infraction conviction and that Adams v. 
Pocatello, 91 Idaho 99,416 P.2d 46 (1966), stood for the proposition that no 
administrative hearing needed to be held in Adams' case, who had been jailed because he 
could not post the needed sum of money as surety for satisfaction of a future money 
judgment against him resulting from a motor vehicle accident and that in dicta, the Idaho 
Supreme Court had said that where a compelling police regulatory function (such as 
suspensions due to failure to carry liability insurance) exists, such as to prevent 
catastrophic financial consequences to the innocent party in the event of an accident were 
involved, that no administrative hearing would be needed prior to the suspension of 
driving privileges. I also told him that I had reviewed the Administrative Rules (Idaho 
Appellate Rules) and that had he exhausted his administrative remedies, he would have 
been entitled to appeal directly to the District Court, but according to him, Mr. Davidson 
had not availed himself of this and was now attempting to get me to appeal his original 
driver's license suspension through his court trial for DWP and that I was not going to be 
able to accomplish that objective for him. He asked me to inquire of the Court and I 
obliged him and at the Pre-Trial Conference I asked Judge Oths (sitting for Watkins) ifhe 
would entertain the merits of an original administrative license suspension in a DWP 
trial. Oths said "probably not." So, at Mr. Davidson's JT date on March 13, 2008, after 
exhaustive discussions with Mr. Davidson (in the presence of Intern, John Lorbeck as a 
witness), Mr. Davidson told me "to get him the best deal I could and he'd plead guilty." I 
told him I had spoken to Mr. Wickham and the standard deal was still on the table, after 
which Mr. Davidson said, "give it to me, I'll plead guilty." 
Response to Allegations in Affidavit of Ryan Davidson in Support of the Petition for 
Post Conviction Relief 
1) On or about August 28, 2007, I received a letter from the Department of 
Transportation which notified me that my license had been suspended for 
failure to pay two infractions. 
Response: Mr. Davidson did not show me the letter so I am without knowledge. 
2) The two infraction penalties which had not been paid related to-failure to 
renew my driver's license (LC. §49-319) and fictitious display of plates (I.C. 
§49-456). 
Response: I have no personal knowledge. However, prior to advising Mr. 
Davidson, I looked up Idaho Infraction Rule (IIR) 10, which said that the Clerk 
would send a Notice to the DOT indicating that Mr. Davidson failed to pay his 
traffic infraction. He told me that his two infractions were not "traffic 
infractions" subject to a suspension. However, I told him that I believed that both 
his infractions were included in "traffic infractions." Idaho Code §49-456(2), 
(Fictitious display of license plates) falls within IIR 9 (b )(16). Idaho Code §49-
319 (Failure to Renew DL) falls within IIR 9(b)(l 0). 
3) On November 29, 2007, I was arrested for driving without privileges. 
Response: I have no personal knowledge. 
4) Some time before the scheduled pre-trial conference of February 19, 2008, I 
made contact with my public defender, Kevin Rogers. 
Response: Agreed. 
5) I instructed Mr. Rogers that I wanted him to enter a motion to dismiss the 
charges. I was personally familiar with at least two possible legal defenses 
that I wanted to have raised, and relayed those defenses to Mr. Rogers. 
Response: Agreed. 
6) The defenses that I asked Mr. Rogers to raise were related to the proposition 
that the driver's license should never have been suspended in the first place: 
a. That a summary suspension of a driver's license for failure to pay an 
infraction, without notice and opportunity for .a pre-suspension 
hearing, was a violation of the right to due process, and therefore the 
DWP could not stand. This defense was largely based on the holding 
of the Washington State Supreme Court in the case of Redmond v. 
Moore, 151 Wash.2d 664 (2004). 
Response: I asked Mr. Davidson to get me copies of his 
correspondence with the Department of Transportation (DOT), 
because I didn't know what kind of due process he was entitled to 
prior to suspension of his driver's privileges, but that I would do the 
research prior to the Pre-trial Conference. I asked Mr. Davidson if he 
knew that his driver's privileges had been suspended, whether or not 
the suspension was legal or not, when was driving on November 29, 
2007. Mr. Davidson's response was "of course I did. I didn't pay the 
fine and I was driving." I looked at I.C. §49-1502 which sets forth the 
procedure if a D admits an infraction and pays the penalty, the 
judgment is sent to the DOT. I also read that a person charged with an 
infraction does not have the right to a jury trial. I reviewed Redmond 
and it stood for the proposition that suspension of driving privileges 
for non-payment of an infraction, without prior administrative 
privileges is an unconstitutional denial of due process. I told Mr. 
Davidson that WA Sup. Ct. law was not binding on Idaho and why, 
hut that I would do more research. 
b. That Idaho Code § 49-1505 did not mandate a mandatory suspension 
in my case, since it only applied to "traffic" infractions. "Traffic," as 
defined by I.C. § 49-121 (3 ), refers to a moving violation. I was 
convicted of two non-moving violations. (See ,i 2 above.) 
Response: I looked at IIR 2(i) defines "moving traffic infraction" as 
an infraction offense involving a vehicle or motorized cycle for which 
driver violation points are assessed under § 49-326, Idaho Code. 
7) Mr. Rogers asked me to email him a copy of the Redmond decision, which I 
did on February 13, 2008, (Copy of the truncated email attached as Exhibit 
'A.' 
Response: Agreed. 
8) I did not hear from Mr. Rogers until I appeared at my pre-trial hearing on 
February 19, 2008, where he informed me that he had received my email, but had 
not read the case. I discussed with him the defense I wanted and the fact that I 
wanted him to file a motion to dismiss. 
Response: I met with Mr. Davidson at his Pre-trial Conference and told him 
that I had read the Redmond case, but that I did not think that Redmond would 
be binding in this case. I told Mr. Davidson that I did not believe that he had 
any valid Rule 12 motions because I had been provided nothing by him which 
would suggest that he had pursued his administrative remedies. Mr. Davidson 
argued that under Idaho Code § 49-515, he did not receive any administrative 
hearing prior to his driver's license being suspended. I asked Mr. Davidson 
why he had not provided me with copies of any correspondence he had 
received from the DOT? Mr. Davidson said he didn't know where it was. I 
told him that I had looked at (IIR 9) administrative rules and that in my 
opinion, the level of "due process" he would have received, varied based upon 
whether he appeared at his infraction hearings or had defaulted. Mr. Davidson 
then admitted that "yea, I went to every one of them and I lost. And then I 
just didn't pay the fines." I told him that the Clerk of the Court would have 
sent him some kind of notice of his right to appeal the judgment of conviction 
of the infraction and that if he had not pursued his administrative rights by 
appealing, he would not be entitled to "bootstrap" his defenses into his trial 
for DWP. I told him that I had looked at the Administrative Rules (IIR 8) and 
that he must have been given a warning that his driver's license would be 
suspended if he did not pay the infraction penalty. Mr. Davidson would not 
tell me if he had received such a letter or not. I explained to Mr. Davidson 
that under the Administrative Rules, if he had not taken the steps as he had 
been directed by the Court and/or DOT, he would not be able to appeal 
directly to the District Court under IIR 15 ( citations omitted). Mr. Davidson 
was furious. 
9) Mr. Rogers made it very clear, without even knowing the full details of my 
proposed defense, that he had no interest in doing anything but plea 
bargaining. During our conversation, he said something to the effect of, "You 
shouldn't be burdening the public defender's office with this and you should 
be doing this yourself." I repeatedly asked him to file the motion to dismiss 
on my behalf. At the conclusion of our meeting, he told me to sign a 
document and a box was checked that seemed to indicate I was requesting a 
jury trial. He wrote beside the box "wants me to file a motion to dismiss," or 
something to that effect. Mr. Rogers also asked me to send him an email 
outlining the defense points we had discussed. 
Response: I told Mr. Davidson that the Pre-trial Conference was not the 
place to argue his defenses to the Court and it was only for the purpose of 
bargaining his case to a fair conclusion, to him and to the State. I remarked to 
him that I had not had the opportunity to exhaust my research into his various 
issues because of the limited time constraints of my daily court calendar and 
asked him ifhe had any education because he argued well and asked whether 
he had thought about doing this himself. 
I 0) On February 21, 2008, I sent Mr. Rogers an email discussing my defense 
points. (Attached as Exhibit 'B.") Because I was worried that he may have 
missed the point I was trying to make about my defense, I informed him in the 
email that I did not want a jury trial, because my defense was legal in nature 
and not factual. There were no disputed facts that I knew ofto bring to a jury. 
I wanted the motion to dismiss filed, and if it was ruled against, at that point I 
would either appeal or plead guilty. 
Response: Agreed. 
11) I called Mr. Rogers and left messages two or three times prior to the 
scheduled jury-trial date of March 13, 2008, to find out what the status ofmy 
motion was. My calls were not returned. 
Response: I don't know how many calls during this period of time I received 
from Mr. Davidson. 
12) When I arrived at the court for the scheduled jury-trial date, I had no idea if a 
motion had been filed, if a jury trial had been scheduled, or what was expected 
ofme. 
Response: I have no personal knowledge of what Mr. Davidson knew or 
understood when he arrived on March 13, 2008. 
13) Mr. Rogers informed me that he had not filed a motion to dismiss, that he 
refused to do so, and that he felt my proposed defenses were frivolous. I 
argued with him and an associate of his from the public defender's office 
about the validity of my defense for what seemed like 15 or 20 minutes. 
Some of the argument related to an old Idaho precedent, Adams v. Pocatello, 
91 Idaho 99,416 P.2d 46 (1966), that Mr. Rogers informed me of for the first 
time at this meeting. I felt from what he told me about the case it did not 
nullify my defense, because it dealt with a situation factually different than 
mine and laws that were no longer on the books. Mr. Rogers was also very 
insistent on the point that I should have challenged the license suspension 
administratively, and that my failure to do so would bar a defense that 
attacked the original suspension. I felt that failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies would be no bar to this type of defense. I pointed out that my 
situation was identical to the one presented in Redmond v. Moore, supra .. 
wherein the defendants had used a successful due process challenge as a 
defense to DWP. I also communicated that I felt that there were no 
administrative remedies to pursue. Mr. Rogers told me that they were in 
IDAPA. Upon later inspection (the next day), I found that there are no 
administrative remedies in IDAP A that are applicable to the type of 
suspensions that I received. The only process that relates to license 
suspensions is found at IDAPA 39.02.72, which deals with administrative 
suspensions under LC. § I 8-9002A for driving under the influence. There 
were other arguments as well, but I cannot recall all of them. 
Response: I told Mr. Davidson that I had looked at some case law (Adams) 
and some administrative rules, including IDAPA. I told him that in my 
opinion, I did not have any ICR Rule 12(b) motions that I could ethically file 
and that his failure to exhaust his administrative remedies, failure to provide 
me with copies of any correspondence from the DOT, had made me 
uncomfortable in filing a Motion to Dismiss and that while the Professional 
Rules require me to abide by the objectives he wanted to accomplish, but that 
his insistence on my filing what I considered to be frivolous pleadings in order 
to accomplish his objectives were jeopardizing my ability to continue to 
represent him ethically and at that point suggested that because he was 
obviously well educated on the law that perhaps he could do this himself, 
without the aid of the Public Defender's Office, because at this point it was 
becoming burdensome to argue points with him. I explained to Mr. Davidson 
that I had spoken to Judge Michael Oths for a minute or so, apologizing first 
of all for all the time I had needed to take with Mr. Davidson's case, when 
there were other clients I was neglecting. I told him that Judge Oths' 
comment to me was that while he did not want to rule from his office chair on 
a motion to dismiss, he did not think he would permit Mr. Davidson to bring 
these motions prior to seating the jury. I conveyed this to Mr. Davidson and 
he then asked me to see what kind of a plea agreement I could achieve for 
him. 

